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Abstract
We argue that it is the number of agents using market power, rather than the use of
market power itself, that may drive Ricardian economies into autarchy. As a consequence, the
monopoly equilibrium outcome Pareto-dominates the oligopoly one. Thus, counter-intuitively,
a non monotonic relationship between number of agents endowed with market power and
economic efficiency may emerge.
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1 Introduction
The Ricardian principle of comparative advantage is a cornerstone of classical trade theory.
Absent any impediment to trade, countries specialize in the production of the good for which
they enjoy a comparative advantage. Consequently, competitive economies achieve productive
efficiency and potential gains from trade are exploited.
Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997) -CG henceforth- pose the question about “whether, and
the extent to which, the use of market power by economic agents on the world market would
alter the prediction of the Ricardian theory” (p. 334). The answer they provide is positive:
market power may drastically affect the Ricardian outcomes. Indeed, CG demonstrate that in
a wide class of Ricardian economies where all of the agents are endowed with market power,
autarchy is the only outcome to be expected. Their result is striking since their model is built
to generate the largest incentives to trade.
This note complements the answer provided by CG, by analyzing the case in which all the
market power is concentrated in a monopolist. We use Baldwin (1948) monopoly equilibrium
concepts to argue that in the class of Ricardian economies identified by CG, monopoly equilib-
ria always feature trade, whereas autarchy is never an outcome. Consequently, the monopoly
equilibrium outcome Pareto-dominates the oligopoly one. Thus, we maintain that it is the
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number of agents using market power that may force Ricardian economies into autarchy, rather
than the use of market power itself. Stated differently, the distribution of market power in-
fluences the development of trade. In our example, when market power is concentrated in
one agent, the equilibrium outcome is more efficient than when it is evenly distributed among
(few) agents. This observation suggests that there may exist a non-monotonic relationship
between the number of agents holding market power and economic efficiency.1
In the following, Section 2 presents the basic example, Section 3 discusses some general-
izations and concludes.
2 Model and Equilibrium
2.1 The Model
Consider two countries, with one agent in each. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor,
label agentsM and C. There are two consumption goods, 1 and 2, produced out of labor. Tech-
nologies are linear, the production frontier for agent i is defined as
{
yi
ai
1
,
(1−yi)
ai
2
|yi ∈ [0, 1]
}
∈
R
2
+, where a
i
l is the labor input used by agent i ∈ {M,C} to produce one unit of good
l ∈ {1, 2}, and yil is the quantity of labor agent i assigns to the production that good. Like
CG, we assume:
(1) Agent M has a comparative advantage in the production of good 1:
aM
1
aM
2
<
aC
1
aC
2
.
(2) Agent M has an absolute advantage in the production of good 1 and agent C in the
production of good 2: 0 < aM1 < a
C
1 and 0 < a
C
2 < a
M
2 .
(3) Each agent is only interested in the good for which he has a comparative disadvantage:
UM (x1, x2) = x2, U
C(x1, x2) = x1, where U
i(·) is the utility function of agent i, and xl
is the quantity of good l consumed.
Assumptions (1)-(3) guarantee the greatest incentives to trade. Indeed, at the unique com-
petitive equilibrium of this model, each agent completely specializes according to comparative
advantage, and the amounts produced are fully exchanged at the relative prices
p∗
1
p∗
2
=
aM
1
aC
2
.
This results in the competitive utility levels UM (·) = 1
aC
2
and UC(·) = 1
aM
1
, see Figure 1(a).
The only oligopoly equilibrium (CG, p. 338) of this example is autarchic.2 Each agent
produces for self-consumption the good in which it has a comparative disadvantage only, and
the potential gains from trade are unexploited (Figure 1(b)). The intuition is as follows. For
any quantity of good 1 offered by theM -agent, the C-agent has a strategic incentive to increase
its utility by reducing the supply of good 2 and therefore increase the consumption of good 1.
Symmetrically, the same holds for the M -agent.3
1Section 3 briefly discusses this result with respect to the “quasi-anticompetitiveness” property (the rise in the
equilibrium price and thus the decrease in economic efficiency following the increase in the number of competitors)
of Cournot markets.
2If both agents are endowed with market power, then the allocation of labor between the production of two
commodities (yi, i = M,C) is a strategic variable for them. For any pair (yM , yC) ∈ [0, 1]2 the indirect utility of
agent i, V i(yM , yC), may be defined. An oligopoly equilibrium is, thus, a Nash equilibrium of the game that has
V i(yM , yC) as payoff function for agent i. See CG (p.335-338) for more details.
3This result is a special case of CG’s Proposition 2, p. 343.
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2.2 Monopoly equilibrium
Baldwin (1948) analyzes the trade equilibrium conditions of a two-agent economy in the cases
of (i) “monopoly”, (ii) “discriminating monopoly” and (iii) “pure competition”. 4 We apply
concepts (i) − (ii) to our model to find its monopoly equilibria.5 To avoid confusion with
the general concept of monopoly equilibrium we refer to Baldwin (1948) “monopoly” as “pure
monopoly”. In the rest of the paper let agent M be the monopolist.
2.2.1 (i) Pure Monopoly
The “pure monopolist” (p-monopolist, henceforth) sets a price vector, [p¯1, p¯2] ∈ R
2
+, or, equiv-
alently, relative prices p¯1
p¯2
≡ p¯, and agent C reacts to them according to utility maximization.
Three cases may occur.
(a) For all p¯ >
aC
1
aC
2
, the competitive agent fully specializes in the production of good 1, and
demands the same quantity of good 1 for consumption.
(b) For p¯ =
aC
1
aC
2
, the competitive agent is indifferent among producing any plan on its frontier,
and demands a quantity 1
aC
1
of good 1.
(c) For all p¯ <
aC
1
aC
2
, the competitive agent fully specializes in the production of good 2 and
demands a quantity p¯
aC
2
> 1
aC
1
of good 1.
The p-monopolist sets p¯ to obtain the highest possible quantity of good 2 in exchange for the
least quantity of good 1. Thus all relative prices of case (c) are not an optimal choice, because
for all these prices agent C offers the same quantity of good 2, in exchange for a quantity of
good 1 which is the larger the lower p¯ is. Similarly, all relative prices of case (b) are excluded,
since at all these prices agent C does not produce good 2. The p-monopolist is left with the
option to set p¯ =
aC
1
aC
2
≡ p¯∗ only. This is its optimal choice, indeed, at p¯∗, agent C is indifferent
among all production plans on its production frontier, and demands 1
aC
1
units of good 1 for
consumption. Thus, the p-monopolist maximizes its utility by allocating a quantity of labor
y¯M =
aM
1
aC
1
to the production of good 1, so as to meet the demand of agent C at p¯∗ and obtain
in exchange from this agent its full production of good 2. The p-monopolist, is left with 1−
aM
1
aC
1
units of labor to produce good 2 for self-consumption, yielding to a quantity
aM
1
ac
1
aM
2
. Any other
labor allocation for the p-monopolist is not optimal, since either it reduces the quantity of
good 2 for self consumption, without increasing the quantity of good 2 obtained from agent
C (if yM > y¯M), or it cannot buy all of the good 2 produced by agent C at p¯∗. The utility
reached by the p-monopolist is UM∗ = 1
aC
2
+
aM
1
aC
1
aM
2
, which is larger than the autarchic one,
while agent C enjoys its autarchic utility. This excludes the possibility that the p-monopolist
chooses not to trade. Thus, the only pure monopoly equilibrium of this model features trade.
2.2.2 (ii) Discriminating Monopoly
A discriminating monopolist (d-monopolist henceforth) “[makes] an all-or-none offer, and the
other country, [...], reacts in the best way to the given amounts and prices” (Baldwin, 1948,
4Other analyses of monopolized Ricardian economies include Sweeney (1974) and Rieber (1982).
5In our case, these concepts lead to the same equilibrium outcome, but this needs not to hold in general, see
Baldwin (1948).
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Figure 1: Competitive (a), Autarchic/Oligopoly (b), Monopoly (c) equilibria.
p. 756). Let E = [e1, e2] ∈ R
2 be the exchange vector proposed by the d-monopolist to the
C-agent. Its elements are the quantities the d-monopolist demands to agent C, negative values
represent a quantity offered. The d-monopolist seeks to obtain the largest amount of good 2 in
exchange for the least quantity of good 1 that makes agent C accept the deal. This quantity is
1
aC
1
, the autarchic consumption by the C-agent. Any lower quantity of good 1 in exchange for
good 2 would not make agent C willing to trade, whereas any larger quantity could be reduced
and still allow to exchange. In return for this quantity, the d-monopolist can demand any
combination of goods on the C-agent’s production frontier. Thus, it will demand the quantity
1
aC
2
of good 2. Accordingly, the exchange vector proposed is EDM = [− 1
aC
1
, 1
aC
2
] ≡ EDM∗,
which is accepted by the C-agent. Like in the pure monopoly case, the d-monopolist is left with
1−
aM
1
aC
1
units of labor for the production of good 2 for self consumption. The C-agent enjoys its
autarchic utility level, while the d-monopolist reaches a utility level UDM∗ = 1
aC
2
+
aM
1
aC
1
aM
2
. No
other exchange vector provides the d-monopolist with a utility level equal or larger, therefore
at the only discriminating monopoly equilibrium of this model agents trade. Notice that
EDM∗ implicitly defines the terms of trade (
aC
1
aC
2
), which coincide with p¯∗. Figure 1(c) depicts
monopoly equilibria.
The autarchic outcome of strategic interaction follows from the failure of agents holding
market power to coordinate their actions. Under monopoly, this coordination role is taken up
by the monopolist, that acts as a self-interested Walrasian auctioneer.
3 Discussion and Conclusion
Both monopoly equilibrium concepts applied to our example point to the same result. When
market power is concentrated in one agent only, trade always characterizes equilibrium, while
autarchy never does. This result can be generalized. First, imagine that the distribution of
comparative advantages is the same as in this paper, but agent C (agent M) enjoys absolute
advantages in the production of both goods. Agent M still proposes an exchange with relative
(explicit or implicit) prices equal to the slope of the C-agent’s production frontier. Agent M
(agent C) then fully specializes according to comparative advantage, whereas agent C (agent
4
M) specializes only partially. Second, assume that the monopolist faces a competitive fringe
of identical agents. In this case, it still exploits its market power to govern the allocation
of resources. The volume of trade depends on the production possibilities of the monopolist
relative to that of the fringe. If the monopolist enjoys an absolute production advantage
with respect to the whole fringe it manipulates the terms of trade to induce the competitive
fringe to specialize according to comparative advantage, and buy all of its production of good
2. By contrast, if the monopolist’s production possibilities do not allow for absorbing all
the production of the competitive fringe, the monopolist may decide to trade with a fraction
of it only, or to trade with all C-agents, but in such a way to induce an individual partial
specialization. In any case, specialization according comparative advantage, either partial or
total, occurs at equilibrium.
Further, notice that the monopoly equilibrium outcome is Pareto-efficient, since the M -
agent’s utility level is larger than the competitive one. Thus, to concentrate all the market
power in one agent restores Pareto efficiency with respect to the situation where market power
is uniformly distributed among (few) agents. This proves that Ricardian economies may not
display a monotonic relation between the number of agents endowed with market power and
economic efficiency.
Finally, this note connects the partial-equilibrium literature on entry in Cournot mar-
kets (see Amir and Lambson 2000 and the references therein contained) and that on general-
equilibrium Ricardian trade. In particular, the outcome that the equilibrium price in Cournot
markets may increase with the number of competing firms, leading to a decrease in the indus-
try’s efficiency, is known as “quasi-anticompetitiveness”, and depends on the relative shapes
of the market demand and of the individual cost functions. Our example shows that Ricardian
economies may be “quasi-anticompetitive”, but this phenomenon originates from the poten-
tial loss of coordination among agents when moving from a situation where market power is
concentrated to one where it is evenly distributed.
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